Suffolk Journal of Trial and Appellate Advocacy
Volume 5

Issue 1

Article 14

1-1-2000

Communication with Represented Persons: An Analysis of the
Scope of Rule 4.2 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional
Conduct as It applies to Corporations and Federal Prosecutors
Ashlie L. Ringel,
Suffolk University Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.suffolk.edu/jtaa-suffolk
Part of the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
5 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advoc. 181 (2000)

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Collections @ Suffolk. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Suffolk Journal of Trial and Appellate Advocacy by an authorized editor of Digital Collections @ Suffolk.
For more information, please contact dct@suffolk.edu.

COMMUNICATION WITH REPRESENTED
PERSONS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SCOPE OF
RULE 4.2 OF THE MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AS IT APPLIES TO
CORPORATIONS AND FEDERAL PROSECUTORS

The legal system in its broadest sense functions best when persons
in need of legal advice or assistanceare representedby their own counsel.'

I. INTRODUCTION

Rule 4.2 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct took
effect January 1, 1998.2 The Massachusetts version of Rule 4.2, commonly known as the anti-contact rule or no-contact rule, provides that
"[iln representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the
subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent
of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so."3 Rule 4.2 has been
adopted in some form by all fifty states through their respective bar associations. 4 Having a basic understanding of the scope of Rule 4.2 is im' MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (MODEL CODE)

Canon 7, Ethical

Consideration 7-18 (1986).
See MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (MASS. RULES) Rule 4.2
(1998). The Massachusetts version of Rule 4.2 replaces former Massachusetts Disciplinary Rule (DR) 7-104 (A)(1) of the Massachusetts Canons of Ethics and Disciplinary
Rules Regulating the Practice of Law. MASSACHUSETTS CANONS OF ETHICS AND
DISCIPLINARY RULES REGULATING THE PRACTICE OF LAW (MASS. CANONS) DR 7-

104(A)(1) (1981).
3 MASS. RULES Rule 4.2 (1998). The Massachusetts version
of Rule 4.2 is identical
to Rule 4.2 of the American Bar Association (ABA) MODEL RULES of Professional Conduct- MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (MODEL RULES) Rule 4.2 (1995). Rule
4.2 applies to communication by an attorney with any represented person on the matter
of the representation, not just to a named party. MASS. RULES Rule 4.2 cmt. 3 (1998).
4See
Ira H. Leesfield, Ex Parte Communications by Government Lawyers with
Represented Parties,72 FLA. B.J. 18, 20 (1998) (discussing historical perspective of
Model Rule 4.2 and its application in all fifty states); Neals-Erik William Delker, Corn-
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portant for all attorneys because the anti-contact rule pervades all areas
of practice from transactions to litigation.5 A great deal of recent controversy and debate surrounds Rule 4.2, including to whom the anti-contact
rule applies, when it applies, and which state's anti-contact rule should be
enforced when dealing with a violation of the rule in federal court.6
Much of the controversy is due to the fact that the language of the rule is
vague and ambiguous.7
Rule 4.2 does not bar communication by an attorney with a represented person on matters outside the representation, nor does it bar direct
communication between the parties to a matter. 8 Rule 4.2 bars communication by an attorney with a represented person only when the attorney
knows, in fact or from the surrounding circumstances, that the person is
represented in the matter to be discussed. 9 An attorney may, however,
communicate with a represented person on the matter of the representation if he has the consent of opposing counsel or if he is authorized by
law to do so.10 The prohibition against communication by an attorney
with a represented person continues to exist even when the represented
ment, Ethics and the Federal Prosecutor:The Continuing Conflict Over the Application
of Model Rule 4.2 to FederalAttorneys, 44 AM. U.L. REv. 855, 858 (1995) (noting long
and pervasive history of anti-contact rule).
5 See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen, New EthicsRules Have Trapsfor Attorneys, MASS.
LAW. WKLY., Jan. 12, 1998, at 1 (noting Massachusetts attorneys should familiarize
themselves with new Rules of Professional Conduct); Garrett Hodes, Ex Parte Contacts
With OrganizationalEmployees in Missouri, 54 J. Mo. B. 83, 83 (1998) (stressing understanding of Rule 4.2's reach is necessary to effective advocacy); ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 396 (1995) (indicating Rule 4.2
applies equally in transactional context as in context of litigation).
6 See ABA Comm. On Ethics and Professional Responsibility, supra note 5 (acknowledging Committee wrote opinion in response to controversy surrounding Rule
4.2); CorporateCounsel: Corporate Counsel Meeting Provides Forumfor Views on Ex
Parte Contact Rules, 14 Law. Manual on Prof. Conduct 545 (November 25, 1998) (observing unsettled nature of present law surrounding Rule 4.2).
7 See Chief Justice Herbert P. Wilkins, The New MassachusettsRules of Professional Conduct: An Overview, 82 MASS. L. REV. 261, 264 (1997) (commenting Rule 4.2
is indefinite and understandably controversial).
a See MASS. RULES Rule 4.2 cmt. 1 (1998). The comments to Rule 4.2 provide
further insight and guidance for the practicing attorney facing a Rule 4.2 ethical dilemma, but the text of the rule is authoritative. MASS. RULES, Scope (9).
9 See MASS. RULES Rule 4.2 cmt. 5 (1998). Where the person is not known to be
represented, Rule 4.3 of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct governs the
attorney's communication with that person. Mass. Id.
'" See MASS. RULES Rule 4.2 (1998). "Authorized by law" includes seeking and
obtaining a court order permitting such communications. Id. MODEL CODE Canon 7,
Ethical Consideration 7-18 (1986)
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person initiates the contact." The represented person cannot waive 12the
anti-contact rule; only the represented person's attorney may waive it.
This Note addresses some of the most current and controversial
issues surrounding the anti-contact rule.' 3 Section II of this Note examines the evolution of Rule 4.2 and its underlying policy considerations.' 4
Section III addresses the scope of Rule 4.2 when the represented "person" is a corporation.1 5 Courts, as well as state bar associations, have
interpreted Rule 4.2 differently in this regard and various tests have been6
established to determine which corporate employees may be contacted.'
Finally, Section IV addresses the scope of Rule 4.2 as it effects federal
prosecutors.' 7 Over the last decade the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) has diligently maintained that federal prosecutors are exempt
from the anti-contact rule. Recent court decisions and legislation have
" See ABA Comm. On Ethics and Professional Responsibility, supra note 5 (stating Rule 4.2 does not contemplate client waiver, as decided in Formal Opinion 108
(1934)); Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and FederalProsecutors: The ControversiesOver the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv.
291, 341-44 (1992) (noting anti-contact rule, unlike many other ethics rules, does not
permit client waiver).
12 See ABA Comm. On Ethics and Professional Responsibility, supra note 5 (explaining that anti-contact rule protects not only represented persons but also effectiveness of attorney's representation); Cramton & Udell, supra note 11, at 341-44 (acknowledging that anti-contact rule is paternalistic and discussing potential benefits of allowing
client waiver).
's This Note will not address other, equally important, issues surrounding Rule 4.2,
such as its application to pro se lawyers and its effect on class action suits.
14 See infra notes 20-39 and accompanying text. The evolution of Rule 4.2 of the
Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct has mirrored the evolution of Rule 4.2 of
the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct. As such, interpretations and opinions regarding Model Rule 4.2 are equally applicable to the Massachusetts version of Rule 4.2.
"See infra notes 40-80 and accompanying text.
"See ABA Comm. On Ethics and Professional Responsibility, supra note 5 (attempting to clarify scope of Rule 4.2's application to corporations); Jerome N.
Krulewitch, Comment, Ex Parte Communications With Corporate Parties:The Scope of
the Limitationson Attorney Communications With One of Adverse Interest, 82 Nw. U.L.
REV. 1274, 1285-1301 (1988) (outlining variety of tests that have been used in applying
anti-contact rule to corporate parties); Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Ex ParteCommunications
With Currentand FormerEmployees, SD06 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1065, 1069 (1998) (noting
different approaches courts have adopted regarding Rule 4.2 when adverse party is corporation).
' See infra notes 81-132 and accompanying text.
"See Memorandum from Dick Thornburgh, Attorney General, United States Department of Justice (June 8, 1989), reprintedin In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478,489-93
(exh. E) (D.N.M. 1992) (declaring federal prosecutors exempt from state anti-contact
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rejected the DOJ's position, however, and have attempted to definitively
pull federal prosecutors back within the purview of Rule 4.2.19

II. THE HISTORY OF RULE 4.2
A. Evolution of the Anti-Contact Rule
The anti-contact rule has a long history deeply rooted in the legal
profession.2" The anti-contact rule first existed as an implied rule of professional courtesy. 21 In 1908, the American Bar Association (ABA)
adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics. 22 Canon 9 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics was the first formal anti-contact rule.2 In
1970, the ABA drafted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(Model Code) to replace the Canons of Professional Ethics. 24 The ABA
Model Code similarly contained an anti-contact rule, Disciplinary Rule
(DR) 7-104(A)(1), barring communication by an attorney with a represented party on the matter of the representation. 25

rules); 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1995) (asserting again federal prosecutors exempt from Rule 4.2);
see also Leesfield, supra note 4 (summarizing repeated attempts by DOJ to exempt federal prosecutors from Rule 4.2); Delker, supra note 4, at 855-73 (outlining development
of DOJ's position on Rule 4.2).
1
See United States v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 1252, 1256 (8th Cir.
1998) (holding DOJ lacks authority to exempt federal prosecutors from Rule 4.2); 28
U.S.C. § 530B (1999) (codifying holding of McDonnell Douglasdecision and explicitly
making federal prosecutors subject to Rule 4.2); see also Joan C. Rogers, Regulation of
Bar: Congress Enacts Statute that Subjects Federal Prosecutors to State Laws and
Rules, 14 Law. Manual on Prof. Conduct 498 (October 28, 1998) (considering reactions
to new law making government attorneys subject to Rule 4.2).
20 See Cramton & Udell, supra note 11, at 318 (noting anti-contact rule is longstanding and widely adopted); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
supra note 5 (acknowledging that every ethical code adopted by American Bar Association has included anti-contact rule).
21 See Cramton & Udell, supra note 11, at 324 (observing anti-contact rule existed

informally as courtesy even before it appeared in any ethical code).
2 See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908).
" See id. at Canon 9. Canon 9 provided, in pertinent part: that "[a] lawyer should
not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by
counsel ... but should deal only with his counsel." Id.
24
See MODEL CODE (1986).
2See id. at DR 7-104(A)(1). DR 7-104(A)(1) provided, in pertinent part:
"[d]uring the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not... communicate
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In 1972, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) adopted
the Canons of Ethics and Disciplinary Rules Regulating the Practice of
Law (Canons). 26 The Canons were modeled after the ABA Model
Code.27 Specifically, DR 7-104(A)(1) was incorporated into the Canons
as the Massachusetts anti-contact rule.
In 1983, the ABA adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) to replace the Model Code.29 The anti-contact rule of
the Model Rules, Rule 4.2, as initially created was essentially the same
as DR 7-104(A)(1). 3° In 1995, however, the ABA House of Delegates
voted to amend Model Rule 4.2 by changing the word "party" to "person" in the text of the rule. 3' The ABA made this change in response to
the confusion and controversy surrounding the scope of Model Rule
4.2.32 The ABA attempted to resolve the ambiguity of the term "party"
and made the change in light of the spirit and underlying policy considerations of the anti-contact rule.33 Finally, in 1998, the SJC adopted the
Rules of Professional Conduct for Massachusetts attorneys.3 4 The Massachusetts version of Rule 4.2 is identical to Model Rule 4.2."

or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party he
knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter." Id.
See MASS. CANONS (1981). The Canons of Ethics and Disciplinary Rules
Regulating the Practice of Law were adopted as Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:07.
2 See Gilda Tuoni, Massachusetts Attorney Conduct Manual 7-95, Intro-4 to Intro-5 (Butterworth ed. 1992) (indicating MASS. CANONS followed provisions of American Bar Association Model Code).
2 See MASS. CANONS DR 7-104(A)(1) (1981).
2

See MODEL RULES Rule 4.2 (1995).

30 See id.
31 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
supra note 5 (announcing proposal to amend Rule 4.2).
32 See id. (acknowledging much of debate surrounding Rule 4.2 caused by use of
term "party").
33 See id. (explaining anti-contact rule must have broad coverage to serve its purpose). The Comment to Rule 4.2 already referred to "persons," but this was not seen as
authoritative and only added more confusion to the controversy. See MODEL RULES Rule
4.2 cmt. 3 (1995).
U See MASS. RULES (1998).

' See id. at Rule 4.2. The SJC adopted the same language of ABA Model Rule
4.2. Model Rule 4.2.
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B. Policy Considerationsof the Anti-Contact Rule
There are several policies and rationales that underlie the anticontact rule.36 The primary purpose of the prohibition against communication by an attorney with a represented person is to protect the attorneyclient relationship and to promote effective representation. 37 The anticontact rule also serves to protect the represented person and his or her
interests. 3 8 A more noble objective of the anti-contact rule is to act as a
deterrent by dissuading attorneys from contacting represented persons of
adverse interest.39

III. SCOPE OF RULE 4.2 WHEN THE REPRESENTED "PERSON" IS
A CORPORATION

See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, supra note 5 (discussing purpose and premise of anti-contact rule); Fitzpatrick, supra note 16, at 1068
(citing cases attempting to explain policy behind anti-contact rule); Cramton & Udell,
supra note 11, at 324-25 (offering various rationales for anti-contact rule); Krulewitch,
supra note 16, at 1277-78 (analyzing three objectives of anti-contact rule). The anticontact rule is premised on the principle that "the legal system in its broadest sense
functions best when persons in need of legal advice or assistance are represented by their
own counsel." MODEL CODE Canon 7, Ethical Consideration 7-18 (1986).
" See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, supra note 5 (noting Rule 4.2 protects attorney-client relationship from interference by opposing counsel);
Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (decided
under DR 7-104(A)(1)) (explaining anti-contact rule maintains integrity of attorneyclient relationship).
"' See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, supra note 5 (indicating Rule 4.2 protects represented person from overreaching by opposing counsel);
Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 103 Wash. 2d 192, 197, 691 P.2d 564, 567 (1984) (decided under DR 7-104(A)(1)) (explaining anti-contact rule helps to prevent represented
persons from being taken advantage of); Polycast Tech. Corp., 129 F.R.D. at 625 (noting anti-contact rule protects represented person from inadvertently divulging privileged
information).
"' See Krulewitch, supra note 16, at 1278 (noting anti-contact rule intended to
promote ethical behavior within legal profession). The anti-contact rule "prevents unprincipled attorneys from exploiting the disparity in legal skills between attorney and
lay people." Polycast Tech. Corp., 129 F.R.D. at 625 (quoting Papanicolaou v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 720 F. Supp. 1080, 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
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The meaning and scope of Rule 4.2 is relatively straightfor Nard
when applied to an individual. 4° A lawyer representing a client may not
communicate with a represented person of adverse interest. 4' The
meaning and scope of Rule 4.2 becomes more vague and ambiguous,
however, when applied to a corporation.42 A corporation is a legal entity
capable of suing and being sued.43 The debate in this area focuses on the
issue of who or what constitutes the corporation when it becomes a party
to a lawsuit."4 An attorney must guess at the ethical limits of Rule 4.2
when dealing with an adverse party corporation.4 5
When the SJC adopted Rule 4.2 for Massachusetts attorneys in
46
1998, plaintiffs' lawyers and prosecutors argued that it was too broad.
The definition of "person" in Rule 4.2 includes "a corporation, an association, a trust, a partnership, and any other organization or legal
entity." 47 Concerned parties argued that such language could be used by
defense attorneys representing a corporation or any business entity in an
attempt to block communication with any and all employees of the cor-

40 See Krulewitch, supra note 16, at 1275 (commenting on clear definition of
"party" as applied to individuals under DR 7-104(A)(1)).

" See MASS. RULES Rule 4.2 (1998).
42
See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, supra note 5 (articulating ABA's position on issue of ex parte communication when "person" is corporation); Wilkins, supra note 7, at 265 (observing need for clearer description as to which
corporate employees are covered by anti-contact rule); Hodes, supra note 5, at 83 (attempting to clarify confusion surrounding application of Rule 4.2 to corporate employees); Krulewitch, supra note 16, at 1275 (noting ambiguity of Rule 4.2 as applied to
adverse party corporations).
' See William L. Cary & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 75 (The Foundation Press, Inc. ed., 7th ed. 1995) (explaining that entity
status is characteristic of corporations).
" See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, supra note 5 (attempting to clarify ABA's position on Rule 4.2 as it applies to collective entities);
Krulewitch, supra note 16, at 1275-76 (addressing problem of identifying who or what
represents artificial entity).
"' See Krulewitch, supra note 16, at 1275-76 (asserting that attorneys are unsure of
Rule 4.2's boundaries when facing adverse party corporation); John Freeman, Former
Employees May Be Interviewed Ex Parte(Usually), 9 S.C. LAw. 10, 10 (1998) (observing that attorneys facing adverse party corporation confront unclear and misleading ethical guidelines).
"See Wilkins, supra note 7, at 264 (acknowledging scope of Rule 4.2 as adopted
"seems to reach too far"); Cohen, supra note 5 (observing that opponents of Rule 4.2
were disappointed with adoption of broad version of Rule 4.2).
47 See MASS. RULES Rule 9.1(h)
(1998).
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porate client. 48 Although this concern was well-founded, the debate was
not a novel one. 49 One of the most controversial issues surrounding DR
7-104(A)(1) of the Model Code was which employees of a corporate
client were considered a "party" within the meaning of that anti-contact
rule. 50
Despite the change to the text of Rule 4.2 that substituted "person"
for "party," the same question remains: who is included in the class of
"persons" to be protected by Rule 4.2 when the adverse party is a corporation?5' Courts and bar associations have adopted various tests in an
attempt to answer this question. 52 The tests, applied to both current and
former3 employees, have failed to produce a specific description of "per5
son."

A. CurrentEmployees
The Comment to the Massachusetts version of Rule 4.2 attempts
to define 'the scope of the rule as it applies to current employees of a represented adverse party corporation. 54 At a minimum, practitioners should
"' See Wilkins, supra note 7, at 264-65 (considering concerns of prosecutors and
plaintiffs' lawyers regarding charges or claims against adverse party corporation);
Cohen, supra note 5 (noting fear of plaintiffs' lawyers and prosecutors that Rule 4.2
would interfere with investigative activities).
4 See John D. Hodson, Annotation, Right of Attorney to Conduct Ex ParteInterviews With Corporate Party'sNonmanagement Employees, 50 A.L.R.4th 652 (1996)
(addressing same issue with DR 7-104(A)(1) of MODEL CODE); Krulewitch, supra note
14, at 1275 (examining controversy regarding DR 7-104(A)(1) as applied to corporations).
. See Hodson, supra note 49 (outlining tests used to determine who is and is not
"party" under DR 7-104(A)(1)); Krulewitch, supra note 16, at 1285-1301 (setting forth
approaches used to define "party" under DR 7-104(A)(1)); Siguel v. Trustees of Tufts
College, No. CIV.A.88-0626-Y, 1990 WL 29199 (D. Mass. March 12, 1990) (considering "hotly-debated" issue of defining "party" in corporate context under DR 7104(A)(1)).
6'See Wilkins, supra note 7, at 265 (discussing controversy surrounding Rule 4.2
and need for better definition of "person" in corporate context).
" See Fitzpatrick, supra note 16 (highlighting various approaches taken by courts
on this issue); Hodson, supra note 49 (explaining tests adopted by courts); Krulewitch,
supra note 16, at 1285-1301 (reviewing tests formulated by courts and bar associations
in applying Rule 4.2 to adverse corporate party).
' 8 See Wilkins, supra note 7, at 265 (acknowledging vague definition of "person").
"See MASS. RuLES Rule 4.2 cmt. 4 (1998) (explaining prohibitions of Rule 4.2 in
context of organizations). Comment 4 to Rule 4.2 bars communications "with persons
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not contact managerial employees or employees who may bind the corporation based on their acts, omissions, or statements regarding the subject of the representation. 55 Despite this apparent bright-line rule, distinguishing between managerial employees and non-managerial employees
may prove to be difficult in practice. 56 Similarly, distinguishing between
those corporate employees who may bind the corporation and those who
are mere witnesses may prove to be difficult.57 This difficulty has forced
the courts and bar associations to adopt various tests to clarify these disdetermine which corporate employees adverse
tinctions and ultimately
58
attorneys may contact.
The Massachusetts Bar Association Committee on Professional
Ethics (Massachusetts Ethics Committee) applies the scope of employment test in determining which current corporate employees may be
contacted. 59 This test interprets Rule 4.2 broadly and prohibits a lawyer
from communicating with any current corporate employee about matters

having managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization with regard to the subject
of the representation, and with any other person whose act or omission in connection
with that matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal
liability or whose statement may constitute an admission on the part of the organization."
Id. Although the Comment attempts to explain the scope of Rule 4.2 as it applies to an
organization, the text of Rule 4.2 is authoritative. See MAss. RuLEs Scope (9).
"6See MASS. RULES Rule 4.2 cmt. 4 (1998) (explaining application of Rule 4.2 to
organization); Hodes, supra note 5, at 87 (suggesting bright-line rule for attorneys that
managerial employees cannot be contacted); Wilkins, supra note 7, at 265 (indicating
reasonable rule would allow attorneys to contact non-managerial corporate employees);
see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, supra note 5 (noting
private attorney may consent to contact where corporate employee represented by private
attorney).
" See Hodes, supra note 5, at 87 (suggesting that in large corporation determining
which employees constitute management may be difficult task); Hodson, supra note 49
(indicating question as to who or what constitutes managerial employees remains unanswered).
'6 See Hodes, supra note 5, at 87 (suggesting difficulty in distinguishing between
employees who may bind corporation and mere fact witnesses).
" See Hodson, supra note 49 (discussing tests adopted by courts and bar associations in determining what constitutes managerial employees).
"See Mass. Bar Ass'n. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 82-7 (1982), reprinted in 67 MASS. L. REV. 208 (1982) (under DR 7-104(A)(1)) (following reasoning
and conclusion of New York City Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics);
see also Comm. on Prof'l Ethics of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Op.
80-46 (1980) (under DR 7-104(A)(1 )) (asserting need for broad coverage of rule in order
to promote effective representation of corporation).
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within the scope of his or her employment. 60 Under the scope of employment test, the only instance in which a lawyer may communicate
with a current employee concerning any matter within the scope of his or
her employment is when the lawyer has the consent of opposing corporate counsel or if the communication is authorized by law.6'
Acting under the exception to the anti-contact rule, the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts applies a balancing
test in determining which current corporate employees are protected under Rule 4.2.62 This balancing test weighs the plaintiffs need to gather
information informally with the defendant corporation's need for effective representation. 63 When one party seeks authorization or protection
" See Mass. Bar Ass'n. Comm. on Prof I Ethics, supra note 59 (suggesting broad
interpretation is necessary to promote policy rationale and to protect corporation). The
Massachusetts Committee emphasizes the fact that the scope of employment test complements the rules of evidence, specifically Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D). Id.
The Federal Rules of Evidence state that "[a] statement is not hearsay if... the statement
is offered against a party and is... a statement by his agent or servant concerning a
matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the
relationship." Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). The Massachusetts Committee concluded that
these employees should similarly be covered by the anti-contact rule because this rule of
evidence binds the corporation as to statements made by these employees. Mass. Bar
Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, supra note 59.
6' See Mass. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, supra note 59 (explaining scope
of employment test complements rule of evidence regarding admissions). The scope of
employment test gives the anti-contact rule its "broadest interpretation in the corporate
context." Krulewitch, supra note 16, at 1290. See id. at 1290-94 (analyzing and criticizing scope of employment test).
6 See Mompoint v. Lotus Development Corp., 110 F.R.D. 414,420 (D. Mass.
1986) (decided under DR 7-104(A)(1)) (rejecting universal rule and adopting case-bycase balancing test); Morrison v. Brandeis University, 125 F.R.D. 14, 18 (D. Mass. 1989)
(decided under DR 7-104(A)(1)) (following holding in Mompoint); Siguel v. Trustees of
Tufts College, No. CIV.A.88-0626-Y, 1990 WL 29199 * 3 (D. Mass. March 12, 1990)
(decided under DR 7-104(A)(1)) (following reasoning of Mompoint court and Morrison
court and adopting case-by-case analysis). The Morrison court makes clear that it is
addressing only the "limited question of when the Court should apply the exception to
the rule ("unless authorized to do so") and authorize an attorney to interview employees
of a defendant corporation whose statements may be admissible against the corporation."
Morrison, 125 F.R.D. at 18 n.l. The Morrison court is careful not to criticize the anticontact rule itself or any interpretations given to the rule, but deals only with the situation in which one party seeks authorization or protection from the court. Id.
" See Mompoint, 110 F.R.D. at 418 (holding need for effective representation does

not require absolute bar on communication with corporate employees). In reaching a
balance, the Mompoint court allowed plaintiff's counsel to interview selected employees
of the defendant corporation. Id. at 419. Similarly, the Morrison court found that plaintiff's counsel's need to obtain information outweighed the defendant corporation's need
for effective representation. Morrison, 125 F.R.D. at 19.
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from the court, this jurisdiction rejects tests that attempt to apply a universal rule and instead uses a case-by-case analysis in which the court
considers particular facts and circumstances."
At least one state court applies the control group test in determining which current corporate employees attorneys may contact. 65 The
control group test interprets Rule 4.2 narrowly and limits the protection it
extends to corporate employees. 66 This test allows communication by an
attorney with current employees of an adverse party corporation except
to the extent that the employees are part of the corporation's control
group.67
The ABA, as well as one state supreme court, has adopted the
managing speaking test." This test allows communication with employees of an adverse party corporation except to the extent that the employees have managing authority in which they are legally able to speak for
or bind the corporation. 69 Although the coverage under the managing

"See MASS. RULES Rule 4.2 cmt.7 (1998) (explaining rule does not prohibit attorney from seeking court order allowing communication with represented person); see also
Mompoint, 110 F.R.D. at 418 (noting there are varying degrees of need and absolute rule
does not accommodate this concept); Morrison, 125 F.R.D. at 18 (characterizing other
tests applied to anti-contact rule in corporate context as inadequate). At least one state
court has also adopted a balancing test. See Craine v. Trinity College, No.
CV950555013S, 1998 WL 809534 (Conn. Nov. 3, 1998) (relying on Morrison case in
adopting case-by-case analysis).
"See Fair Automotive Repair, Inc. v. Car-X Service Systems, Inc., 128 Ill. App.
3d 763, 766, 471 N.E.2d 554, 560 (1984) (decided under DR 7-104(A)(1)) (allowing
communication with current employees of adverse party corporation not in control
group). The Fair Automotive court adopted the control group test in response to the
Illinois Supreme Court's adoption of the control group test for the corporate attorney
client privilege. See Krulewitch, supra note 16, at 1286-90 (analyzing decision of Illinois court in adopting control group test).
" See Krulewitch, supra note 16, at 1286-90 (criticizing control group test for narrow interpretation of rule and for exposing corporations unnecessarily).
See id. (explaining contours of control group test); Hodson, supra note 47 (noting employees who may be protected by Rule 4.2 under control group test). The control
group includes "top management persons who had the responsibility of making final
decisions and those employees whose advisory roles to top management are such that a
decision would not normally be made without those persons' advice or opinion." Fair
Automotive, 128 111.App. 3d at 771,471 N.E.2d at 560.
"See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, supra note 5 (explaining ABA's position on scope of Rule 4.2 as it applies to adverse party corporation);
Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 103 Wash.2d 192, 200-01,691 P.2d 564, 569 (Wash.
1984) (decided under DR 7-104(A)(1)) (adopting managing speaking test).
"See Wright, 103 Wash. 2d at 200, 691 P.2d at 569 (allowing communication
with corporate employees not legally able to bind corporation). The managing speaking
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speaking test appears to be extensive with respect to certain corporate
employees, the prohibition against communication does not extend to all
employees of the corporation.7"
Notwithstanding that courts and bar associations have developed
various tests in an attempt to define the scope of Rule 4.2 when applied
to a corporation, no single definition has been universally accepted.7 1
The anti-contact rule is not meant to prohibit communication by an attorney with all current employees of a represented corporation.7 2 Beyond
this tenet, the scope of Rule 4.2 as it applies to current corporate employees is still in the process of being defined. 73 In the meantime, Massachusetts practitioners should not contact managerial employees or employees
who may in any way bind the corporation regarding the subject of the
representation unless first seeking authorization from a court. 74

B. FormerEmployees

The scope of Rule 4.2 as it applies to former employees of an adverse party corporation is more clearly defined. 75 According to the ABA,
test is very similar in its application to the Comment to Rule 4.2. See Krulewitch, supra
note 16, at 1301 (acknowledging that both protect same group of corporate employees
and should produce same result).
" See Krulewitch, supra note 16, at 1297-1304 (concluding that managing speaking test provides workable standard for attorneys).
71See Fitzpatrick, supra note 16, at 1069, 1071-83 (summarizing approaches taken
by courts and examining case law and ethics opinions for each state); Krulewitch, supra
note 16, at 1285-1301 (noting various interpretations of anti-contact rule each rely on
different policy considerations); Wilkins, supra note 7, at 264-65 (declaring need in
Massachusetts for "careful description" of which current corporate employees may be
contacted).
72See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, supra note 5
(stressing Rule 4.2 does not contemplate blanket prohibition covering all employees of
represented corporation).
73 See Wilkins, supra note 7, at 264-65 (noting controversy and uncertainty surrounding prospective adoption of Rule 4.2 in Massachusetts in 1998); Fitzpatrick, supra
note 16, at 1069, 1071-83 (addressing only recently issue of communication with current
employees of represented corporation).
74 See MASS. RuLES Rule 4.2 cmt.4 (1998) (clarifying scope of
Rule 4.2 as it applies to organizations); see also MASS. RULES Rule 4.2 cmt.7 (1998) (explaining attorney
may seek and act under court order allowing communication with represented person).
' See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, supra note 5 (restating and clarifying ABA's position that Rule 4.2 does not prohibit communication
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former employees of a corporate defendant may always be contacted. 76
Similarly, the Massachusetts Bar Association has opined that the anticontact rule does not apply to former employees."7 Most courts have also
held that former employees are not included in the class of persons to be
protected under Rule 4.2.78 The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts has held that former employees may be contacted
where there is no ongoing relationship with the corporate defendant and
where the former employee can no longer bind the corporation. 79 Massachusetts practitioners can feel safe that they are acting within ethical
guidelines when contacting any former employee so long as the subject
of the communication cannot be imputed to the corporation for liability
purposes.80

with former employees); Mass. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 7 (1982) (declaring DR 7104(A)(1) does not apply to former corporate employees); Hodes, supra note 5, at 86
(asserting that scope of Rule 4.2 in relation to former employees is generally settled).
76 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, supra note 5 (reiterating ABA's position which it had previously stated in 1991 opinion. In 1995, the
ABA announced that Rule 4.2 "does not prohibit contacts with former officers or employees of a represented corporation, even if they were in one of the categories with
which communication was prohibited while they were employed." Id. The ABA Committee firmly opined that although "arguments can be and have been made for extending
the ambit of Model Rule 4.2 to cover some former corporate employees, the fact remains
that the text of the Rule does not do so and the comment gives no basis for concluding
that such coverage was intended." Id.

" See Mass. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. 7 (1982) (asserting DR 7-104(A)(1) does not
apply to former corporate employees because no ongoing agency relationship).
78See Wright v. Group Health Hosp., 103 Wash. 2d 192, 201, 691 P.2d 564, 569
(Wash. 1984) (decided under DR 7-104(A)(1)) (explaining that former employees cannot
speak for or bind corporation); Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621,
628 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (decided under DR 7-104(A)(1)) (holding anti-contact rule does not
prohibit communication with former employee in this case).
7' See Amarin Plastics, Inc. v. Maryland Cup Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36 (D. Mass.
1987) (decided under DR 7-104(A)(1)) (holding attorney's communication with former
managerial employee did not violate anti-contact rule). The Amarin Plasticscourt determined that communication with former employees of a corporate defendant is allowed
under the anti-contact rule where the former employees do not have an "ongoing agency
or fiduciary relationship with the defendant or where none of their acts or omissions
could be imparted to the defendant for.., liability purposes." Siguel v. Trustees of Tufts
College, No. CIV.A.88-0626-Y, 1990 WL 29199 at 4 (D. Mass. March 12, 1990) (referring to holding of Amarin Plastics case). The Amarin Plasticscourt found that the former employee in question did not have an ongoing agency or fiduciary relationship with
the corporation nor could his acts or omissions be imputed to the corporation. Amarin
Plastics, 116 F.R.D. at 40.
"See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, supra note 5 (noting that Model Rule 4.2 does not prohibit communication with former corporate employ-
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IV. SCOPE OF RULE 4.2 AS IT EFFECTS FEDERAL
PROSECUTORS
Application of the anti-contact rule to federal prosecutors is a
controversial issue that has intensified over the last decade and has recently reached a boiling point.81 The change of the word "party" to "person" in the text of Model Rule 4.2 in 1995 (and as adopted in Massachusetts in 1998) expanded the protection afforded by the anti-contact rule
and further limited acceptable communication by federal prosecutors.8 2
The DOJ is the leader in the attack against the expanding application of
Rule 4.2.3 The DOJ argues that "the scope of Model Rule 4.2 has been
broadened to the point that it becomes difficult or impossible for federal
prosecutors to fulfill their law enforcement responsibilities." 84 Over the
last decade the DOJ has repeatedly attempted to exempt federal prosecutors from state anti-contact rules.8 5 The DOJ has met strong resistance,

ees); Wilkins, supra note 7, at 265 (suggesting that allowing attorney contact with former
corporate employees is reasonable rule). Cf.American Plastics, 116 F.R.D. at 39-40
(allowing communication with former employee where act, omission or statement cannot
bind corporation).
8' See Todd S. Schulman, Note, Wisdom Without Power: The Departmentof Justice's Attempt to Exempt FederalProsecutorsFrom State No-Contact Rules, 71 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1067, 1069 (1996) (noting intense debate concerning exemption of federal
prosecutors from Rule 4.2); Leesfield, supra note 4, at 18 (asserting that debate over
Rule 4.2's application to federal prosecutors has "reached a head").
" See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, supra note 5 (discussing proposal to substitute "person" for "party" in text of Rule 4.2 to give broader
coverage). The ABA explicitly stated that Rule 4.2 applies to criminal matters, including
federal and state prosecutors. Id.
"3See Leesfield, supra note 4 (outlining repeated attempts by DOJ to limit reach of
Rule 4.2 to exclude federal prosecutors); Delker, supra note 4 (examining development
of DOJ's position on Rule 4.2); Cramton & Udell, supra note 11, at 318-22 (tracing
controversy surrounding DOJ's interpretation of Rule 4.2).
"Leesfield, supra note 4, at 20. See Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 18, at
489 (indicating broad interpretation of anti-contact rule threatens to become "substantial
burden" on law enforcement process).
' See Thomburgh Memorandum, supra note 18 (representing DOJ's first assertion
that its attorneys are exempt from Rule 4.2); 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1995) (representing DOJ's
second attempt to exempt federal prosecutors from Rule 4.2).
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however, and courts, and most recently, legislatures have rejected its
position. 6

A. The Thornburgh Memorandum
Although the DOJ has always maintained that federal prosecutors
are exempt from state anti-contact rules, until 1988 courts had not actively enforced the anti-contact rule. 87 In United States v. Hammad,8s
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explicitly rejected the position of the DOJ.8 9 The Hammad court held that
the anti-contact rule applies to federal criminal investigations even before adversarial proceedings have begun. 90 This decision directly affected the DOJ because it explicitly made the prohibitions of the anticontact rule applicable to pre-indictment and pre-arrest investigations of
suspected criminals who were represented by an attorney. 91
The DOJ responded to the Hammad decision with the Thornburgh
Memorandum. 92 Attorney General Richard Thornburgh circulated a
memorandum to all DOJ litigators in an attempt to clarify the DOJ's position regarding the scope of the anti-contact rule as it applies to federal
w See United States v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 1252, 1257 (8th Cir.
1998) (holding Reno Rule invalid); 28 U.S.C. § 530B (1999) (codifying holding of
McDonnell Douglasand explicitly making federal prosecutors subject to Rule 4.2).
87See Delker, supra note 4, at 862 (explaining that lack of enforcement by courts
was reason for DOJ's lackadaisical attitude). The DOJ had not previously taken a forceful position on its policy that federal prosecutors are exempted from the anti-contact rule
only because it did not have to. Id.
858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 871 (1990).
See id. at 839 (holding anti-contact rule applies even in investigatory stage of
judicial process).
See id. at 838 (concluding that anti-contact rule applies "both before and after
indictment").
' See Delker, supra note 4, at 862-65 (noting Hammad case forced issue further
than any previous case); Leesfield, supra note 4, at 18-20 (stating Hammad decision
ignited issue triggering DOJ's assertion that its attorneys are exempt from rule); Cramton
& Udell, supra note 11, at 319-20 (observing Hammad decision "sent shock waves"
through DOJ).
2
' See Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 18 (articulating DOJ's position on
anti-contact rule as it applies to federal prosecutors). Attorney General Richard Thornburgh stated in the Memorandum that the Hammad decision perpetuated "the uncertainty
felt by many government attorneys over what is appropriate conduct in this area." Id. at
490.
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prosecutors.93 The DOJ articulated as its policy that during the course of
a criminal investigation, prior to any formal adversarial proceedings,
government attorneys and individuals acting under their direction may
communicate with any person, whether they are known to be represented
by counsel or not.94
The DOJ premises its policy of exemption of federal prosecutors
from state anti-contact rules on two grounds. 95 First, the Thornburgh
Memorandum asserts that the "authorized by law" exception in the text
of the anti-contact rule includes all communication by federal prosecutors with represented persons. 96 Second, the Thornburgh Memorandum
asserts that the Supremacy Clause of the Tenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution (Supremacy Clause) protects federal prosecutors from any enforcement of the anti-contact rule at the state or local
level. 97
The Thornburgh Memorandum met immediate resistance from
both bar associations and courts. 98 The ABA strongly opposed the DOJ's
position and argued federal prosecutors are subject to the ethical rules of

9 See Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 18, at 489-93 (discussing how policy

of DOJ has developed over number of years). The Thornburgh Memorandum cites a
1980 memorandum from the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel asserting that "the extent to
which the Department requires its attorneys to conform their conduct to judicial and bar
association interpretations of DR 7-104 is solely a question of policy." Id. at 491.
See id. at 492 (clarifying DOJ's position). The DOJ made its position clear that
"contact with a represented individual in the course of authorized law enforcement activity does not violate DR 7-104(A)(1)." Id. at 493.
" See id. at 493 (relying on "authorized by law" exception in text of anti-contact
rule and on Supremacy Clause); Delker, supra note 4, at 865-66 (explaining grounds on
which DOJ's position is based); Leesfield, supra note 4, at 18-20 (stating that Attorney
General anticipated resistance to DOJ's position so provided sources of claimed authority).
" See Thornburgh Memorandum, supra note 18, at 492-93. The DOJ asserts that
its attorneys, and anyone acting under their direction, are authorized to engage in undercover operations and, as such, are authorized to communicate with represented persons
during the course of an investigatory undercover operation. Id. at 492.
97 See id. at 493 (relying on Supremacy Clause for protection against disciplinary
action by any authority other than United States).
98See United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1440 (N.D. Cal. 1991), vacated,
989 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir.), amended and superseded, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting federal prosecutor's use of Thomburgh Memorandum as defense); In re Doe, 801 F.
Supp. 478, 482 (D.N.M. 1992) (holding that federal prosecutor who violated anti-contact
rule was not protected against state disciplinary proceedings); 6 LAW. MANUAL ON PROF.
CONDUCT 25 (February 28, 1990) (noting opinion of ABA on issue).
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the state bar association in the state in which they are admitted. 99 The
courts criticized the Thornburgh Memorandum and effectively reduced it
to nothing more than a DOJ policy statement.'00
In United States v. Lopez,' 0 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court decision that rejected a federal prosecutor's attempt to use the Thornburgh Memorandum as a justification for violating the anti-contact rule.1' 2 The Lopez court specifically rejected the DOJ's proposition that the actions of federal prosecutors are "authorized by law" within the meaning of Rule 4.2 simply because the Attorney General announced them as such. 0 3 Similarly, in the
case of In re Doe,1°4 the United States District Court for the District of
New Mexico rejected a federal prosecutor's argument that the Supremacy
Clause prohibited the state ethics board from initiating proceedings
against him.' 0 5 The In re Doe court rejected the legal force of the Thornburgh Memorandum an interpreted it, instead, as a policy statement incapable of preempting state law.1°6

" See 6 LAw. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT 25, 27 (February 28, 1990) (setting
forth ABA's position and policy in response to Thornburgh Memorandum); Crarnton &
Udell, supra note 11, at 321-22 (discussing heated reaction by ABA and defense bar to
Thornburgh Memorandum). The ABA passed a resolution to "oppose any attempt by the
Department of Justice unilaterally to exempt its lawyers from the professional conduct
rules that apply to all lawyers under applicable rules of the jurisdictions in which they
practice." 6 LAw. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUcT 25, 27 (February 28, 1990).
'0 See Lopez, 4 F.3d at 1458 (expressing disdain for Thornburgh Memorandum
and referring to it as policy statement of Attorney General); In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. at
487 (refusing to recognize Thornburgh Memorandum as controlling law).
101 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993).
'2 See Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1445-50 (criticizing government's dependence on
Thornburgh Memorandum); Lopez, 4 F.3d at 1457-58 (noting prudence of government's
decision to drop reliance on Thornburgh Memorandum as justification for attorney's
actions).
'03
See Lopez, 4 F.3d at 1461-62 (holding communication not authorized by law
pursuant to statutory scheme or pursuant to judicial approval).

"'801 F. Supp. 478 (D.N.M. 1992).
See id. at 484-86 (holding Thornburgh Memorandum does not constitute federal
law and cannot preempt local ethics rules).
' See id. at 487 (asserting Thornburgh Memorandum is not law because DOJ had
no authority to issue it). In In re Doe, the court noted "[w]ere this Court to recognize the
memorandum as law, it would allow an agency to issue a regulation exempting itself
from ethical restrictions in the absence of any delegated authority or congressional mandate to do so." Id.
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B. The Reno Rule
Despite the controversy surrounding the Thornburgh Memorandum, the DOJ maintained its position that federal prosecutors are beyond°7
the reach of state anti-contact rules and promulgated the Reno Rule."
After suffering harsh criticism from courts and bar associations that it
had no authority to promulgate rules in this area, the DOJ now justified
its rulemaking power by citing to the authority delegated by Congress to
the Attorney General in the Housekeeping Statute. 08 The DOJ again
proclaimed that federal prosecutors who communicate with represented
persons are "authorized by law to do so" and are protected from state
disciplinary authorities by virtue of the Supremacy Clause.1°9
The Reno Rule was directly challenged in the case of United
States v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation.110 In McDonnell Douglas,
the government argued that its contacts with various employees of
McDonnell Douglas Corporation without the consent of McDonnell
Douglas counsel were authorized by the Reno Rule."' The government
'0' See Communications with Represented Persons, 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1995) (setting
forth what became known as Reno Rule). See Schulman, supra note 81 (referring to 28
C.F.R. § 77 as "Reno Rule" because DOJ adopted it under Attorney General Janet Reno).
Although it was initially promulgated in 1992, the DOJ published the final rule in 1994
after several notice and comment periods. See Schulman, supra note 81, at 1082 (noting
three notice and comment periods for new rule); Delker, supra note 4, at 871-72 (explaining that DOJ withdrew, reconsidered, and resubmitted proposed rule several times
before publishing final rule).
'06See 28 C.F.R. § 77.1(b) (1995) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1994)). The DOJ asserted that the Reno Rule "is issued under the authority of the Attorney General to prescribe regulations for the government of the Department of Justice, the conduct of its
employees, and the performance of its business, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 301." Id.
1' See Communication with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39910, 39912
(1994) (codified as 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1995)). "[Tjhe Department believes it must be the
final arbiter of the scope of policing with respect to ex parte contacts involving federal
prosecutors, subject to the Constitution and laws of the United States. [Tihe Department's rules are intended fully to preempt and supersede the application of state and
local court rules relating to contacts by Department of Justice attorneys when carrying
out their federal law enforcement functions." Id.
"0 132 F.3d 1252 (8th Cir. 1998).
"' See id. at 1254. The DOJ, on behalf of the United States as intervenor, contacted various employees of McDonnell Douglas Corporation during the pre-trial phase
of a lawsuit against McDonnell Douglas without the consent of corporate counsel. Id. at
1253. The district court granted McDonnell Douglas' motion for a protective order
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relied primarily on the Housekeeping Statute as authority for the Attorney General's promulgation of the Reno Rule.' 1 2 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected this argument, holding
that the Housekeeping Statute does not provide statutory authority for
promulgation of substantive regulations."1 3 The McDonnell Douglas
court concluded that the Reno Rule is invalid because
the DOJ lacks
4
statutory authority to promulgate a rule of that kind."

C. Legislative Response: Citizens ProtectionAct

In the latest blow to the DOJ, Congress recently passed a law explicitly subjecting federal prosecutors to state ethics rules in the state in
which they practice.115 This legislation codifies the holding of McDonnell Douglas and essentially forecloses any argument by the DOJ that
16
government attorneys are beyond the reach of the anti-contact rule.
This new law is titled the Citizens Protection Act and became effective in
April of 1999."'
preventing such contacts and the government appealed arguing that the contacts were
authorized under 28 C.F.R. § 77.10(a) (1995). Id. at 1253-54.
s12 See id. at 1254-55. 5 U.S.C. § 301 is known as the "Housekeeping Statute" and
provides that "the head of an Executive department ... may prescribe regulations for the
government of his department, the conduct of its employees, the distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers,
and property." 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
"1 See id. at 1255. Not one of the government's theories
give "the Attorney General the authority to exempt lawyers representing the United States from the local rules
of ethics which bind all other lawyers appearing in that court of the United States." Id. at
1257.
I" See id. (acknowledging lack of statutory authority).
. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (1999); Rogers, supra note 19 (reviewing action taken by
Congress and responses to new law).
16 See Rogers, supra note 19 (citing M. Peter Moses, Chairman of ABA Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility).
17 See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (1999).
This law is part of the Justice Department appropriations provisions that are contained in the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Bill for fiscal 1999, which Congress has approved and
President Clinton has signed. See Rogers, supra note 19 (explaining status and background of new regulation). The new law provides, in pertinent part, that "[aln attorney
for the government shall be subject to State laws and rules, and local Federal court rules,
governing attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that attorney's duties,
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Having consistently argued in the past that federal prosecutors
should be subject to the same ethics rules that govern all other attorneys,
the ABA, state bar associations, criminal defense attorneys, and corporate counsel all praise the new legislation." 8 The DOJ, on the other
hand, strongly opposes the new legislation. 1 9 The DOJ claims the legislation will hamper federal law enforcement. 120 The DOJ also maintains
that because states have adopted varying versions of Model Rule 4.2, the
anti-contact rule lacks uniformity among the states.' 2 ' The DOJ asserts
that this non-uniformity of state ethics rules poses a serious problem for
federal prosecutors who are admitted to the bar in different states but
working on the same case. 122 Although Congress has taken the latest
action in interpreting the scope of Rule 4.2 as it applies to federal prosecutors, the DOJ is not likely to acquiesce.123

to the same extent and in the same manner as other attorneys in that State." 28 U.S.C. §
530B(a).
"sSee Rogers, supra note 19 (noting various groups who oppose position taken by
DOJ and applaud action taken by Congress).
"9See id. (pointing out obvious disappointment and frustration felt by DOJ).
'20
See Leesfield, supra note 4, at 20 (articulating DOJ's fear that Rule 4.2 would
interfere in its law enforcement responsibilities); Rogers, supra note 19 (discussing criticism by DOJ that new law will impede federal law enforcement). This fear is especially
true in the context of federal criminal investigations where undercover operations are
often used. See CorporateCounsel: Corporate Counsel Meeting Provides Forumfor
Views on Ex Parte Contact Rules, supra note 6 (suggesting chilling effect on attorneys'
willingness to work with agents in investigations). The DOJ argues that criminal law
enforcement is unique and the effect of the new legislation will be to interfere with this
process. Id.
121 See Schulman, supra note 81, at 1068-69 (noting varying interpretations lead to
uncertainty for federal prosecutors working on same case); Cramton & Udell, supra note
11, at 323-24 (acknowledging concern of DOJ as legitimate).
'22 See Schulman, supra note 81, at 1068-69, 1078 (explaining uncertainty and fear
of sanctions effect law enforcement efforts of federal prosecutors); Cramton & Udell,
supra note 11, at 323-24 (suggesting effectiveness of uniform rules for federal prosecutors working on cases that cross state lines); Leesfield, supranote 4, at 20 (discussing
concern of DOJ over repercussions of federal prosecutors' actions).
'2 See Federal Courts: Special Committee Will Study FederalRules ofAttorney
Conduct, 11 LAW. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT 294 (June 24, 1998) (listing various
initiatives underway to amend current anti-contact rule or propose new anti-contact
rule).
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D. The Future of Rule 4.2

There are many projects currently in the works that may yet have
a profound effect on the scope of Rule 4.2.124 The United States Judicial
Conference is considering proposals to establish several standardized
rules of professional conduct for lawyers in federal court.2 5 These uniform federal rules would be consistent with the Citizens Protection Act
because the Act specifically makes reference to the fact that federal
prosecutors are subject to state rules and local federal court rules.' 26 Uniform federal rules would also specifically address the DOJ's fear of having its attorneys subject to non-uniform state anti-contact rules. 27
The Conference of Chief Justices of state supreme courts is also
considering proposals to issue a model ethics rule regarding communication with represented persons.' 28 This model rule would serve as an alternative to ABA Model Rule 4.2 for states to consider in adopting their
own ethics rules. 29 The Conference of Chief Justices deferred a vote on
the proposal several times in 31998, however, due to the recent heated
debates surrounding the issue.1 0
124

See id. (mentioning various groups in process of revising certain rules of pro-

fessional conduct). Some of the current initiatives are coming from the ABA Ethics
2000 Project, the American Law Institute, the Conference of Chief Justices of the state
supreme courts, and the U.S. Judicial Conference. Id.
1"See Rogers, supra note 19 (discussing proposed federal rules of conduct and
how new legislation effects this proposal). The plan of the U.S. Judicial Conference is to
establish a few uniform federal rules that touch on important controversial areas while
other matters would still be governed by state ethics rules. Id.
asSee 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (1999); Rogers, supra note 19 (discussing proposal for
adoption of several uniform federal rules of professional conduct).
12
7 See Leesfield, supra note 4, at 20 (articulating DOJ's fear that varying interpretations of Rule 4.2 lead to uncertainty for federal prosecutors); Cramton & Udell,
supra note 11, at 323-24 (suggesting uniform rules may be more effective and less confusing for federal prosecutors).
'2s See Obligationsto Third Persons: Chief Justices, Citing Lack of Consensus, Put
Off Vote on Proposalfor New Rule 4.2, 18 LAw. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUcT 459 (September 30, 1998) (noting proposal would offer states another option in adopting anticontact rule).
1s See id. (indicating Conference of Chief Justices' proposal would expressly
authorize certain communication with represented persons).
"* See id. (citing resolution adopted by Conference of Chief Justices). In August
of 1998 the Conference of Chief Justices decided that any action would be premature
because of the continuing controversy and debate in the legal community on this issue.
Id.
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The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, the author of Model Rule 4.2, is itself considering possible
Similarly, the ABA Ethics 2000
modifications to Model Rule 4.2.'
Commission is studying Model Rule 4.2 to determine if and how it
should be modified. 32 Not only is the scope and application of the curbut there is much controrent version of Model Rule 4.2 being debated,
33
versy over the vitality of the rule itself.
V. CONCLUSION
The history of the anti-contact rule suggests its strong ties to the
legal community. There are numerous policy considerations upon which
the anti-contact rule is based. It is important that the scope and application of Rule 4.2 be clearly defined because the rule is integral to maintaining the ethics and integrity of the legal profession.
A Massachusetts attorney who faces a represented adverse party
corporation and wants to contact corporate employees is, unfortunately,
entering undefined and confusing territory. A common theme in all interpretations of Rule 4.2, however, is that current managerial employees
and current employees who may bind the corporation by act, omission or
statement, are off limits. This does leave practitioners a safe harbor to
some extent within which to ethically contact current employees. Generally, attorneys may contact former employees of a represented adverse
party corporation without regard to Rule 4.2.
Practitioners should keep in mind that they may contact any corporate employee with the consent of corporate counsel or where it is
authorized by law. Similarly, attorneys may depose any corporate employee. Although these create more formal lines of communication with
corporate employees, in some situations this may be the only line of
communication available.

13'

See Rogers, supra note 19 (stating Committee has issued draft of modified ver-

sion of rule for discussion and comment). The ABA is reacting to input from the legal
community that Rule 4.2 and the Comment to Rule 4.2 should be more specific in addressing its application. Id.
2 See id. (explaining Ethics 2000 Commission is project launched to analyze
MODEL RULES generally).
'33See id. (quoting M. Peter Moses, Chairman of ABA Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility).
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The fate of the anti-contact rule as it applies to federal prosecutors
seems to be sealed with the recent passage of the Citizens Protection Act.
Whether the DOJ again asserts that its attorneys are exempt from state
anti-contact rules notwithstanding this legislation remains to be seen.
The DOJ has maintained its position for over a decade and is unlikely to
acquiesce now.
The best solution, and perhaps the best compromise, would be the
adoption of uniform federal rules of professional conduct that include a
federal anti-contact rule. Many of the concerns of the DOJ would be
alleviated because its attorneys would be bound by only one anti-contact
rule. Similarly, the concerns of courts, bar associations and defense attorneys would be alleviated because the DOJ would not appear as though
it is evading all anti-contact rules.
There are many unresolved issues surrounding the anti-contact
rule. Rule 4.2 has been scrutinized by courts, legislatures and bar associations, all which have arrived at varying interpretations as to its scope
and application. Modifications to the existing Model Rule 4.2, as well as
new model anti-contact rules altogether, are likely forthcoming. This
will no doubt have an impact on the Massachusetts version of Rule 4.2,
which will in turn have an impact on all Massachusetts attorneys.
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